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Visual psychophysicists have recently developed tools to measure the maximal speed at which the brain can accurately
carry out different types of computations (H. Kirchner & S. J. Thorpe, 2006). We use this methodology to measure the
maximal speed with which individuals can make magnitude comparisons between two single-digit numbers. We ﬁnd that
individuals make such comparisons with high accuracy in 306 ms on average and are able to perform above chance in as
little as 230 ms. We also ﬁnd that maximal speeds are similar for “larger than” and “smaller than” number comparisons and
in a control task that simply requires subjects to identify the number in a number–letter pair. The results suggest that the
brain contains dedicated processes involved in implementing basic number comparisons that can be deployed in parallel
with processes involved in low-level visual processing.
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Introduction
A basic question in cognitive psychology and neuro-
science is how quickly different types of computations can
be performed, while maintaining a target level of
accuracy. This question is important because its answer
provides useful hints as to the type and amount of
processing required in different tasks, as well as the extent
to which computations are performed by specialized low-
level systems versus more general high-level systems.
Here, we are interested in the speed with which
individuals are able to accurately make basic number
comparisons, such as identifying which of two single-digit
numbers is larger. Number comparisons are important
because they are linked to decision making. For example,
it has been shown that the precision of one’s intuitive
number sense is correlated with the ability to save (Peters,
Slovic, Vastfjall, & Mertz, 2008).
A sizable number of studies have investigated the
processing and comparison of numerical quantities. In a
classic study, Moyer and Landauer (1967) established the
distance effect (Dehaene, 1997; Dehaene & Changeux,
1993) in binary numerical comparisons, which states that
accuracy increases and response times decrease with the
absolute distance between the two numbers being com-
pared. This effect has been replicated in a number of
studies (Dehaene, 1989, 1996) and has motivated the
“mental number line hypothesis,” which states that
numeric magnitude is spatially encoded in the brain
(Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Moyer & Landauer,
1967). Song and Nakayama (2008) investigated this
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hypothesis using a visually guided manual reaching task
in which subjects were asked to compare a single digit
number displayed at the center of the screen with the
number “5” by reaching with their index finger toward the
appropriate location on the screen (left, center, or right of
the displayed number to signify smaller, equal, or larger,
respectively). They found that the greater the numeric
deviation from 5, the greater the deviation of the pointing
trajectory.
More recent work building on these ideas has shown
that random walk models of binary responses, such as the
Drift Diffusion Model, account well for the pattern of
response and reaction times in such tasks (Bogacz, 2007;
Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Dehaene, 2007; Gold &
Shadlen, 2007; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Link
& Heath, 1975; Milosavljevic, Malmaud, Huth, Koch, &
Rangel, 2010; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008;
Sigman & Dehaene, 2005; Usher & McClelland, 2001).
See especially Sigman and Dehaene’s (2005) effort to
dissect the comparison task into subcomponents (percep-
tive, decision, motor) and evaluate the timing of each of
these steps.
This previous literature has shown that number compar-
isons can be made quickly. Moyer and Landauer (1967)
found reaction times that varied from about 500 ms for a
numerical distance of 8 to about 620 ms for a numerical
distance of 1. Unlike Moyer and Landauer (1967), most of
the literature on number comparisons does not display two
digits simultaneously but rather displays a single digit and
asks subjects to identify whether the number is larger or
smaller than a fixed comparison number that does not vary
across trials (Dehaene, 1996; Libertus, Woldorff, &
Brannon, 2007). Using this alternative paradigm, Dehaene
(1996) reported behavioral reaction times of about 370 ms
and 390 ms for large and small numerical distances,
respectively. In a similar task, Libertus et al. (2007)
reported mean reaction times ranging from about 380 ms
for large numerical distances to about 430 ms for small
numerical distances. Using the manual reaching task
described above, Song and Nakayama (2008) found mean
reaction times of 338 T 42 ms at a numerical distance of 1,
which decreased to 313 T 33 ms at a numerical distance of 4.
However, the existing literature does not provide
measures of the minimum response times (MRTs) at
which reliable comparisons can be made. This is an
important shortcoming because MRTs are thought to
provide critical clues about the level of processing (e.g.,
bottom-up vs. top-down) involved in different computations.
Further, there is reason to believe that mean RTs might be
significantly larger than MRTs in numerical comparisons.
For instance, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) related
to the numerical distance effect have been found in parietal
sensors about 200 ms after stimulus onset (Pinel, Dehaene,
Riviere, & LeBihan, 2001; Temple & Posner, 1998).
Here, we apply a novel methodology from visual
psychophysics to provide a better behavioral measurement
of the fastest speed at which number comparisons can be
made. Over the last decade, visual psychophysicists have
developed a useful set of tools to measure a lower
threshold for the time required for successful task
performance (Bannerman, Milders, de Gelder, & Sahraie,
2009; Fabre-Thorpe, Delorme, Marlot, & Thorpe, 2001;
Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001a,
2001b). The application of these methods to perceptual
decision making has shown that individuals can make
high-accuracy perceptual discriminations extremely rap-
idly. For example, Kirchner and Thorpe (2006) found that,
on average, subjects could identify which of two natural
scenes flashed to the left and right hemifields contained an
animal in 228 ms. Utilizing a similar paradigm, Bannerman
et al. (2009) showed that subjects could distinguish a
fearful facial expression or body posture from a neutral one
in 350 ms on average. Most recently, it has been shown that
forced-choice saccades to identify human faces can be
performed above chance and initiated with a mean reaction
time of just 154 ms (Crouzet, Kirchner, & Thorpe, 2010).
In our experiments, we flash pairs of single-digit
numbers briefly (20 ms) to the left and right hemifields
and ask subjects to saccade to the location of the larger
number either as fast as possible or after careful
deliberation (Experiment 1). The use of brief presentations
and saccadic responses is useful because it speeds up
motor responses, thus reducing the total fraction of
reaction times that are unrelated to the computation of
interest. In Experiment 2, we ask subjects to identify the
smaller of the two digits under speed instructions in order
to investigate if it is equally easy for the brain to make
rapid “larger than” and “smaller than” number compar-
isons. Finally, in Experiment 3, we compare these results
to a number identification control task in which subjects
are shown a letter–number pair and asked to identify the
location of the number.
Experiment 1: “Larger than”
number comparisons in speed vs.
accuracy conditions
Experiment 1 examined the basic psychometrics of
single-digit number comparisons. The design was based
on Kirchner and Thorpe (2006; henceforth “KT 2006”).
On each trial, two single-digit numbers were flashed on
the screen for 20 ms, in the left and right hemifields.
Subjects were asked to make a saccade to the location of
the larger number. The task was performed in a speed
condition, in which subjects were instructed to respond as
quickly as possible, and in an accuracy condition, in
which they were asked to respond only after they were
sure of the correct choice.
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Methods
Participants
Twelve Caltech students with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision participated in two 1-h sessions and were
paid /20 per session. All participants gave written
informed consent to participate. The study and experi-
mental procedures were approved by the California
Institute of Technology Institutional Review Board.
Stimuli
Subjects were shown two single-digit numbers (ranging
from 0 to 9) in each trial (Figure 1). Stimuli were
positioned at 5- to the left and right of the center of the
screen. Each character had dimensions of 1.3-  0.7-.
Apparatus
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room with head
position controlled by forehead and chin rests. Eye-position
data were acquired from the right eye at 1000 Hz using
the Eyelink 1000 eye tracker (SR Research, Osgoode,
Canada). The distance between the computer screen and
subject was 80 cm. Images were presented on a CRT
screen, using the MATLAB Psychophysics toolbox and
Eyelink toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Cornelissen,
Peters, & Palmer, 2002). Responses (saccades toward the
left or right option) were recorded when a saccade was
initiated and crossed a threshold of 2.2- horizontal
distance from the center of the screen. Saccadic reaction
time was determined by computing the time difference
between stimulus onset and saccade initiation.
Task
Each trial began by requiring subjects to fixate
continuously on a faint gray cross in the center of the
screen for at least 800 ms (Figure 1). Afterward, the
fixation cross disappeared, leaving the screen blank for
200 ms. This gap period served to accelerate saccade
initiation (Fischer & Weber, 1993). Two single-digit num-
bers (ranging from 0 to 9) were then shown simultaneously
for 20 ms, each positioned at 5- from center in the left and
right hemifields. Two faint dots were next displayed at the
previous locations of the two numbers to indicate the
corresponding choice options. The trial ended when
subjects made a saccade to one side of the screen to
indicate their choice. To minimize learning, pairs were
constructed so as not to repeat the same unordered
combination of numbers in the same 45-trial set. For
example, if “2–3” was included in a set, “3–2” was not
included in the same set.
Subjects completed 900 trials in each of two exper-
imental conditions: a speed condition in which they were
asked to respond as quickly as possible and an accuracy
condition in which they were asked to indicate their
response only after they were sure of the correct choice.
The data for each condition were collected on different
days and task order was counterbalanced across subjects
so that six subjects completed the speed condition first.
Minimum reaction times
It has become standard practice when analyzing the
results of ultra-rapid decision tasks to compute a measure
of the minimum reaction time (MRT) at which subjects
began responding with above-chance accuracy (Crouzet
et al., 2010; Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006). The typical MRT
analysis sorts reaction times in increasing order, divides
them into discrete bins, and then tests the average
accuracy of observations in each bin against a null
hypothesis of chance performance, with the null hypoth-
esis rejected only when above-chance results are observed
in a certain number of consecutive bins. This procedure
has raised some controversy because the resulting MRT
measures are highly sensitive to bin width and placement,
as well as to the number of consecutive above-chance bins
required for significance.
In order to avoid this problem, we computed MRTs using
a more robust method taken from the statistical quality
control literature (Chandra, 2001; Roberts, 1959). The
method has also been used to filter “fast guesses” from
perceptual data when fitting the Ratcliff Drift Diffusion
Model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Vandekerckhove &
Tuerlinckx, 2007). The basic idea is given as follows.
Figure 1. Sample trial from Experiment 1.
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Observations are ordered from low to high response times.
Let Xi denote the accuracy of the ith ordered response (1 =
correct, 0 = incorrect). An exponentially weighted moving
average (EWMA) measure of accuracy is then computed
using the following formula:
EWMAi ¼ 1Xi þ ð1j1ÞEWMAij1; ð1Þ
where 1 is a parameter indicating how much weight to
give to past (ordered) observations in the moving average.
Note that when 1 = 1, the EWMA statistic is based only
on the most recent observation. In contrast, as 1 approaches
0 previous observations are given increasing weight
relative to the latest observation. EWMA0 was set to 0.5
(i.e., chance performance).
Intuitively, the EWMA measure provides an estimate of
how accuracy changes with increasing reaction times.
This measure can then be compared against the null
hypothesis of chance performance on all trials. This null
hypothesis generates a confidence interval for the EWMA
after i observations given by
2 T NA
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
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 
:
r
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The first term in this expression is the mean EWMA
statistic under the null hypothesis, which in our experi-
ment is given by 2 = E(Xi) = 0.5. The second term
provides an expression for the width of the confidence
interval: N is the number of standard deviations included
in the confidence interval, and A = Std(Xi) = 0.5 is the
standard deviation of each observation Xi under the null
hypothesis. Note that under the null hypothesis perfor-
mance in every trial depends on the independent flip of a
fair coin.
The MRT can then be defined as the smallest ordered
reaction time at which the EWMA measure permanently
exceeds this confidence interval. For our analyses, we
chose conservative parameters to reduce the possibility of
false positives: 1 = 0.01 and N = 3. The EWMA analysis
was run separately for each subject and condition.
Results and discussion
Figure 2 depicts the reaction time distributions for both
conditions (speed and accuracy) for correct and error
trials. Table 1 provides individual information on accu-
racy and response times. To screen for anomalous trials,
the fastest and slowest 0.5% of trials pooled across all
subjects were discarded. Average response times were
306 T 15 ms (mean T SEM) for the speed and 345 T 15 ms
for the accuracy condition. The average per-subject
difference in reaction times between the two conditions
(accuracy–speed) was 39 T 11 ms (two-sided paired t-test,
p = 0.0036). Average accuracies were 91.2 T 1.0% in the
speed condition and 95.4 T 1.0% in the accuracy
condition. The average per-subject accuracy difference
between the two conditions (accuracy–speed) was 4.3 T
1.1% (two-sided paired t-test, p = 0.0030). As expected,
subjects were faster and less accurate in the speed
condition.
Mean MRT was 230 T 11 ms in the speed condition and
250 T 11 ms in the accuracy condition. The increase in
MRT from the speed to the accuracy condition was small
but statistically significant (20.8 T 7.1 ms; two-sided
paired t-test, p = 0.014). For better comparison with the
previous literature, we also computed the binned MRT
measure of KT 2006, which is computed using the pooled
data. We chose 10-ms bins centered at 10 ms, 20 ms, etc.,
and a threshold of 10 consecutive bins at a 5% confidence
level. The resulting MRT statistic was 170 ms (i.e., the
165- to 175-ms bin) for the speed task and 190 ms for the
accuracy task. This result shows that our MRT measures
are more conservative than the KT measures and give
more confidence that the average subject is indeed
performing at above-chance levels at the reported MRT
values.
Next, we tested for the presence of a numerical distance
effect, as shown in Figure 3. For reaction times, we fitted a
linear regression of reaction times on the absolute number
difference for each subject. For accuracy, we fitted a
logistic regression of an indicator variable of correct
responses on the absolute number difference for each
subject. The results are shown in Table 2. The mean
fitted RT slope across subjects was j3.1 T 0.8 ms per unit
(two-sided t-test, p = 0.0021) in the speed task and j5.6 T
0.7 ms per unit (two-sided t-test, p = 5.9  10j6) in the
accuracy task. The mean fitted accuracy slope was 0.53 T
Figure 2. Reaction time distributions for the speed and accuracy
conditions in Experiment 1. Correct trials = thick line. Error trials =
thin line. Vertical lines depict mean MRTs.
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0.08 (two-sided t-test, p = 2.6  10j5) in the speed task
and 0.60 T 0.12 (two-sided t-test, p = 4.0  10j4) in the
accuracy task. Thus, in both cases, responses became
faster and more accurate as a function of numerical
distance, confirming the presence of a numerical distance
effect in our experimental setup.
Finally, we looked for an effect of the order in which
the two tasks were performed on accuracy and RTs. We
found no significant order effects either in the speed
condition results (speed condition first: accuracy = 90.7 T
1.1% and RT = 299 T 23 ms; accuracy condition first:
accuracy = 91.6 T 1.8% and RT = 313 T 20 ms; difference:
accuracy =j0.92 T 2.1%, p = 0.67 and RT = j14 T 30 ms,
p = 0.65) or the accuracy condition results (speed
condition first: accuracy = 96.8 T 0.5% and RT = 323 T
21 ms; accuracy condition first: accuracy = 94.1 T 1.9%
and RT = 368 T 18 ms; difference: accuracy = 2.7 T 1.9%,
p = 0.19 and RT = j46 T 28 ms, p = 0.13).
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the
hypothesis that the brain is able to carry out automatic,
rapid, and accurate number comparisons between single
digit numbers with little top-down control. In particular,
we found that deliberate efforts to increase accuracy
slowed responses very little and provided relatively small
accuracy improvements over speeded responses.
Experiment 2: “Smaller than”
number comparisons
Experiment 2 is nearly identical to the speed condition
of Experiment 1, except that subjects were asked to
saccade as quickly as possible to the location of the
smaller number. The goal was to investigate if the brain
could execute “larger than” and “smaller than” number
comparisons at similar maximal speeds.
Methods
Methods are almost identical to those for the speed
condition of Experiment 1 and, thus, are omitted. Twelve
new subjects participated in the task.
S N Accuracy (%) Mean RT (ms) T SEM MRT
Experiment 1: Speed condition
1* 882 86.8 409 T 2.16 237
2* 897 91.8 310 T 1.74 248
3* 896 90.7 265 T 1.51 200
4* 886 94.7 277 T 1.72 200
5* 898 89.4 272 T 1.58 164
6* 891 90.7 261 T 1.39 205
7 878 86.4 285 T 2.65 220
8 889 97.6 401 T 2.42 303
9 896 93.8 297 T 1.19 244
10 887 94.5 295 T 1.38 239
11 894 86.8 268 T 1.26 221
12 898 90.5 332 T 1.39 273
All 10692 91.2 T 1.0 306 T 15 230 T 11
Experiment 1: Accuracy condition
1* 897 97.4 405 T 2.30 310
2* 900 97.9 366 T 2.50 244
3* 895 97.9 311 T 2.35 235
4* 891 96.7 292 T 1.90 221
5* 893 95.5 290 T 1.50 220
6* 900 95.3 271 T 1.53 202
7 870 97.0 420 T 3.11 209
8 893 97.2 413 T 3.16 312
9 897 96.0 317 T 1.57 255
10 896 97.5 357 T 2.32 258
11 892 86.7 318 T 1.82 247
12 865 90.1 385 T 3.21 290
All 10689 95.4 T 1.0 345 T 15 250 T 11
Table 1. Individual mean accuracy, mean RT, and minimum RT (MRT) in Experiment 1. Note: *Denotes that subject completed the speed
condition ﬁrst.
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Results and discussion
We compared the results of Experiment 2 with the
speed condition of Experiment 1. Figure 4 depicts the
reaction time distribution for correct and error trials in
Experiments 2 and Experiment 1 (speed condition), and
Table 3 provides individual information on accuracy,
mean RT, and minimum RT. The mean RT for the task
across all subjects was 322 T 10 ms. The difference in
mean RT between experiments was not significant
(Experiment 2 j Experiment 1 speed: 15.7 T 17.4 ms;
two-sided t-test, p = 0.38). The mean accuracy for the task
across all subjects was 84.6 T 1.9%. The difference in mean
accuracy was statistically significant (Experiment 2 j
Experiment 1 speed: j6.6 T 2.2%; two-sided t-test, p =
0.0060).
The mean per-subject estimated MRT was 247 T 11 ms
(Table 3; MRT). Comparing this result with the average per-
subject MRT from the speed condition of Experiment 1,
we found that the difference in average MRT was 17.5 T
15.0 ms (Experiment 2 j Experiment 1 speed; two-sided
t-test, p = 0.255).
As before, we estimated regression models of the
impact of numerical distance on reaction time and
accuracy, as shown in Figure 5 and Table 4. We compared
these estimates with those for the speed condition of
Experiment 1 to investigate the differences between the
two tasks. We found no difference in the average constant
of either regression (two-sided t-test; RT: p = 0.61,
accuracy: p = 0.65), even though at each numerical
distance the estimated accuracy was higher in the “larger
than” condition than in the “smaller than” condition.
There was a significant difference in the slope of the
accuracy curve (Experiment 2 j Experiment 1 speed:
j0.25 T 0.08; two-sided t-test, p = 0.0064), though not in
the slope of the RT curve (Experiment 2 j Experiment 1
speed: 1.66 T 0.89 ms; two-sided t-test, p = 0.08).
A two-way ANOVA reveals no dependency on numer-
ical distance (p = 0.92) but a significant difference
between the two conditions (p = 0.0029) with an estimated
set size of 17.7 ms with no interaction between the two (p =
0.99).
The results show that “larger than” and “smaller than”
number comparisons have similar psychometric perfor-
mance. The difference in MRT between Experiment 2 and
the speed condition of Experiment 1 was not significant as
measured by RT and MRT. However, a two-way ANOVA
on the aggregated data was significant for the difference
in reaction times between the two experiments. Note that
the size of the effect in all three comparisons is similar, a
bit under 20 ms. This is quantitatively similar to the
difference between the accuracy and speed conditions for
Experiment 1. In fact, the mean estimates for Experiment 2
and the accuracy condition for Experiment 1 are nearly
indistinguishable. Thus, our results suggest that the MRTs
for both types of comparison are very similar.
Experiment 3: Number
identification control
One concern with our experiments is that they might
overestimate the amount of time required to make number
comparisons because, in addition to making a comparison,
they require subjects to identify the two stimuli and
initiate a motor response. We address this concern by
comparing performance in the speed condition of Experi-
ment 1 with performance in a closely related control task
Figure 3. Mean reaction time and accuracy as a function of
numerical distance for Experiment 1. Bars denote SEM across
subjects.
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(Experiment 3) that involves number identification and
motor response but not number comparison. This provides
an additional estimate of the MRTs associated exclusively
with the number comparison component of the task.
Methods
Methods are nearly identical to those for Experiment 1,
and only the differences are highlighted here. Twelve new
subjects participated in the task by completing 600 trials
each. Stimuli were randomly selected pairs consisting of
one single-digit number (ranging from 0 to 9) and one
capital letter from a set of nine. The letters used in the
experiment were chosen to be easily distinguishable from
single-digit numbers: X, V, F, T, J, K, L, U, Y. Subjects
were instructed to saccade to the location of the number as
quickly as possible.
Results and discussion
Figure 6 depicts reaction time distributions for Experi-
ment 3 and for the speed condition of Experiment 1, for
S RT constant (ms/unit) T SEM RT slope (ms/unit) T SEM Accuracy constant T SEM Accuracy slope T SEM
Experiment 1: Speed condition
1* 414 T 18 j1.3 T 1.0 0.82 T 0.03 0.340 T 0.003
2* 321 T 11 j3.3 T 0.6 0.59 T 0.06 0.69 T 0.01
3* 275 T 8.4 j2.8 T 0.5 0.52 T 0.05 0.659 T 0.009
4* 289 T 11 j3.3 T 0.6 0.93 T 0.09 0.79 T 0.02
5* 271 T 9.3 0.3 T 0.5 0.85 T 0.04 0.435 T 0.005
6* 273 T 7.1 j3.2 T 0.4 0.81 T 0.05 0.514 T 0.007
7 295 T 26 j2.7 T 1.4 0.97 T 0.03 0.273 T 0.003
8 441 T 20 j10.9 T 1.1 1.8 T 0.2 0.76 T 0.04
9 310 T 5.1 j3.34 T 0.3 0.88 T 0.07 0.72 T 0.02
10 306 T 6.9 j3.0 T 0.4 0.79 T 0.09 0.84 T 0.02
11 274 T 5.9 j1.5 T 0.3 0.60 T 0.03 0.428 T 0.004
12 339 T 7.1 j2.0 T 0.4 2.55 T 0.05 j0.076 T 0.003
All 317 T 16 j3.1 T 0.8 1.0 T 0.2 0.53 T 0.08
Experiment 1: Accuracy condition
1* 442 T 18 j10.0 T 1.0 1.6 T 0.2 0.85 T 0.05
2* 382 T 23 j4.1 T 1.3 2.3 T 0.2 0.57 T 0.03
3* 330 T 20 j5.3 T 1.1 1.4 T 0.25 1.12 T 0.09
4* 311 T 13 j5.2 T 0.7 1.8 T 0.1 0.61 T 0.02
5* 306 T 8.1 j4.2 T 0.4 1.82 T 0.09 0.43 T 0.01
6* 286 T 8.5 j4.0 T 0.5 0.4 T 0.1 1.24 T 0.05
7 449 T 35 j8.1 T 1.9 2.4 T 0.1 0.36 T 0.02
8 450 T 35 j10.1 T 1.9 2.3 T 0.1 0.46 T 0.02
9 331 T 9.0 j3.6 T 0.5 0.9 T 0.1 0.98 T 0.04
10 374 T 20 j4.7 T 1.1 1.9 T 0.2 0.70 T 0.04
11 331 T 12 j3.7 T 0.7 1.58 T 0.03 0.084 T 0.002
12 401 T 39 j4.3 T 2.1 2.99 T 0.06 j0.192 T 0.002
All 366 T 17 j5.6 T 0.7 1.8 T 0.2 0.6 T 0.1
Figure 4. Reaction time distributions for Experiment 2 and
Experiment 1 (speed condition). Correct trials = thick line. Error
trials = thin line. Vertical lines depict mean MRTs.
Table 2. Individual parameter ﬁts for the reaction time and accuracy curves in Experiment 1. Note: *Denotes that subject completed the
speed condition ﬁrst.
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correct and error trials. Table 5 provides individual
information on accuracy, mean RT, and MRT. The mean
RT across subjects was 262 T 5 ms, which was
significantly faster than in the “larger than” number
comparison task (Experiment 3 j Experiment 1 speed:
j43.6 T 15.4 ms; two-sided t-test, p = 0.0096). The mean
accuracy for the task across subjects was 89.1 T 1.8%,
which was not significantly different from the number
comparison task (Experiment 3 j Experiment 1 speed:
j2.1 T 2.1%; two-sided t-test, p = 0.33).
The mean per-subject MRT was 210 T 5 ms (Table 5),
which was not significantly different from the number
comparison task at conventional confidence levels
(Experiment 3 j Experiment 1 speed: j19.2 T 11.6 ms;
two-sided t-test, p = 0.11). In other words, there is no
evidence that comparing two numbers and choosing the
larger one takes longer than identifying a number over a
letter.
As before, these results show that the estimated differ-
ence in MRTs between two tasks with similar perceptual
and motor demands, which only differ in the need to make
number comparisons, is on the order of 20 ms. This
finding suggests that number comparisons can be made
rapidly and in parallel with low-level visual processing
and identification, as any other model is inconsistent with
our finding that the additional computational burden of
number comparisons adds very little additional processing
time to a basic identification and response initiation task.
General discussion
Our results show that individuals make basic binary
number comparisons with high accuracy in 306 ms on
average and are able to perform above chance in as little
as 230 ms, that maximal speeds are similar for “larger
than” and “smaller than” numerical comparisons, and that
they are also similar in a control task that simply requires
subjects to identify the number in a number–letter pair.
The results suggest that the brain contains dedicated
processes involved in implementing basic number com-
parisons that can be deployed in parallel with processes
involved in low-level visual processing. Such ultra-rapid
responses are generally believed to rely on parallel feed-
forward processing of objects in different regions of the
visual field by the early visual pathways (VanRullen,
2007).
It is useful to compare the psychometric properties of
number comparisons to those of other processes that have
been investigated in the literature using similar methods.
Thorpe, Fize, and Marlot (1996) showed that natural
scenes could be rapidly categorized according to whether
Experiment 2: “Smaller than” comparisons
S N Accuracy (%) Mean RT (ms) T SEM MRT
13 900 86.2 301 T 1.4 213
14 885 85.3 334 T 3.0 184
15 893 86.7 389 T 2.5 295
16 847 70.7 289 T 4.2 275
17 899 91.7 336 T 2.1 225
18 898 87.6 314 T 1.9 259
19 899 95.1 314 T 1.7 250
20 896 83.7 315 T 1.9 250
21 883 86.5 296 T 2.7 203
22 898 77.4 282 T 1.9 242
23 893 77.5 378 T 2.9 309
24 900 86.4 310 T 1.7 259
All 5344 84.6 T 1.9 322 T 10 247 T 11
Table 3. Individual mean accuracy, mean RT, and minimum RT
(MRT) in Experiment 2.
Figure 5. Mean reaction time and accuracy across subjects for
Experiment 2 and Experiment 1 (speed condition). Bars denote
SEM across subjects.
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or not they contain an animal in a go/no go task using
button-press responses (median RT of 445 ms on “go”
trials and differential ERP activity in 150 ms). VanRullen
and Thorpe (2001a, 2001b) found that animals and
vehicles could be categorized in similar time frames in a
go/no go task, indicating no preference for biologically
relevant stimuli (mean RT of 364 ms for animals, 376 ms
for vehicles; minimum RT of 225 ms for animals, 245 ms
for vehicles as measured by earliest above-chance
responses; differential ERP activity detected in 150 ms
for both tasks). Training provided no advantage: natural
scenes to which subjects had been previously exposed
over a 3-week period could be categorized according to
whether they contained an animal as quickly as an entirely
novel set of stimuli (while mean RTs were 424 ms for
familiar and 444 ms for novel stimuli, this discrepancy
was due to elimination of very long reaction times for
familiar stimuli: differential ERP activity was detected
within 150 ms for both types of stimuli; Fabre-Thorpe et al.,
2001). Further, Kirchner and Thorpe (2006) argued, using
a saccadic choice paradigm, that the processing required
for ultra-rapid perceptual decision making may be even
faster than previously believed. They showed that a pair of
natural scenes flashed in the left and right hemifields could
be compared for the presence of an animal with a median
RT of 228 ms and a minimum RT of 120 ms. Utilizing a
similar 2-AFC paradigm, Bannerman et al. (2009) showed
that subjects could distinguish a fearful facial expression
or body posture from a neutral one in under 350 ms (mean
reaction times). Similarly, forced-choice saccades to
identify human faces can be performed above chance
and initiated with a mean reaction time of 154 ms and a
minimum RT of just 100 ms (Crouzet et al., 2010).
In contrast, the number comparisons reported in the
current paper are slower than the pure perceptual
discriminations studied in this previous literature. One
possible explanation for this difference is based on our
choice of the minimum RT measure, which produces
more conservative MRTs than the KT 2006 measure.
Note, however, that even accounting for this difference,
our task produced MRTs 20–40 ms slower than the ERP
activity reported in several of the studies cited above.
Alternatively, the difference might be due to important
distinctions between our task and many of the previous
paradigms. For example, in the KT 2006 task, subjects
had to decide which of two natural scenes contained an
animal. However, as only information from a single scene
is necessary to make a decision, the two images provide
redundant information, which might increase the efficiency
Experiment 2: “Smaller than” comparisons
S
RT constant
(ms/unit) T SEM
RT slope
(ms/unit) T SEM
Accuracy
constant T SEM
Accuracy
slope T SEM
13 302 T 7.8 j0.4 T 0.4 0.58 T 0.03 0.417 T 0.004
14 334 T 32 0.06 T 1.7 0.89 T 0.03 0.269 T 0.003
15 398 T 23 j2.2 T 1.3 1.43 T 0.03 0.127 T 0.002
16 298 T 67 j2.2 T 3.6 0.28 T 0.02 0.174 T 0.001
17 330 T 17 1.6 T 0.9 0.94 T 0.05 0.518 T 0.008
18 322 T 13 j2.1 T 0.7 0.78 T 0.04 0.387 T 0.004
19 329 T 11 j3.9 T 0.6 2.00 T 0.08 0.317 T 0.008
20 326 T 14 j3.0 T 0.8 0.94 T 0.03 0.209 T 0.002
21 299 T 27 j0.7 T 1.5 0.98 T 0.03 0.275 T 0.003
22 292 T 14 j2.6 T 0.7 0.34 T 0.02 0.268 T 0.002
23 379 T 33 j0.3 T 1.8 0.52 T 0.02 0.210 T 0.002
24 316 T 10 j1.5 T 0.6 1.28 T 0.03 0.170 T 0.002
All 327 T 9.3 j1.4 T 0.4 0.9 T 0.1 0.28 T 0.03
Table 4. Individual parameter ﬁts for the reaction time and accuracy curves in Experiment 2.
Figure 6. Reaction time distributions for Experiment 3 and
Experiment 1 (speed condition). Correct trials = thick line. Error
trials = thin line. Vertical lines depict mean MRTs.
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of choices in accordance with signal detection theory.
Furthermore, in some of these non-numerical tasks it is
not even necessary to process a whole image, since
identifying an eye or a feather is sufficient to categorize
an image as containing an animal. In contrast, in our
Experiments 1 and 2, the two information sources were
not redundant, implying that subjects had to process
information from both stimuli in order to solve the task.
This introduces an additional level of difficulty to the task
that might account for some of the differences between
our reaction times and those found by KT 2006 and
others.
The methodology used in this paper to measure MRTs
has also been applied by our group to study the speed at
which subjects can make simple subjective value-based
choices (i.e., choose which of two food items to eat;
Milosavljevic, Koch, & Rangel, 2010). We found mean
reaction times of 403 T 21 ms and a mean MRT of 313 T
17 ms, but with lower accuracies than those obtained here
(73.3 T 1.6%). Such rapid reaction times suggest that the
computation and comparison of values in everyday
decision making may recruit a set of cognitive processes
similar to those involved in basic number comparisons
(King & Janiszewski, 2011; Peters et al., 2008; Valenzuela
& Raghubir, 2010). Needless to say, this possibility is
highly speculative, and further investigation of the
similarities and differences between these mechanisms is
necessary to evaluate its validity.
Our experimental design has two important limitations
that should be addressed in future studies. First, our
stimuli always represented quantities using Arabic
numerals, which are overlearned stimuli, in particular
for our subject pool (members of a university commun-
ity that places a premium on mathematical ability). It
will be important to investigate if the psychometric
properties of the basic number comparison process
change when numerical information is represented in
other ways (e.g., verbal vs. analog vs. auditory) which
have been extensively studied in related domains (Barth,
Kanwisher, & Spelke, 2003; Brannon, 2003; Cantlon,
Platt, & Brannon, 2009; Dehaene, 1992; Dehaene &
Cohen, 1995; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007),
and if the results hold for a more representative sample of
the general population. Second, we considered only non-
negative single-digit numbers. It will be important to
investigate if our findings extend to multi-digit and
negative numbers (Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990;
Fischer, 2003; Fischer & Rottmann, 2005; Ganor-Stern,
Tzelgov, & Ellenbogen, 2007; Hinrichs, Yurko, & Hu,
1981).
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